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Abstract
Enthusiasts for financial sector tax reform  typically come  two key features  of the sector:  its capacity  for arbitrage
either with some form of "flat tax" (including  value  and its sensitivity to inflation and thus to nonindexed
added tax on financial services,  zero taxation on capital  taxes. Where these aspects have been neglected,  poorly
income, or a universal transactions tax)  or advocating  constructed tax systems-whether  the consequence  of a
corrective taxes designed  to offset market failures or  drive for revenue  or of misdirected  sophistication-often
achieve  other targeted objectives. As a result the tax  have sizable  unexpected side effects.  A defensive stance
systems  in most countries often end up with a complex  making the minimization of such distortions as its
mixture.  Honohan argues  that practical  policy for  cornerstone  is the best policy.
taxation of the financial sector needs to take into account
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Because it keeps systematic accounts and acts as a gatekeeper of liquid resources,  the
financial sector provides many useful tax 'handles' for the fiscal authorities.  In many
countries, a distorted structure of financial sector taxation has evolved, reflecting both
inertia and opportunism.  Inertia,  in that some very old taxation and administrative
practices have survived in the financial sector reflecting the convenience of collection,
and the fact that thcse liable to comply are a small and privileged group of regulated
intermediaries who are unlikely to be politically vocal and who can, in any event, pass on
much of the tax to their customers.  Opportunism, in that a sudden need for budgetary
revenue can trigger an increase  in reliance on this quick and reliable source.
Growing awareness  of the strategic importance of the financial sector in catalyzing
economic growth,  combined with the increasing global competition in financial services
has led to a substantial reconsideration  of the domestic financial  sector's potential as a
cash-cow for the budget. '  Indeed,  in some instances  the pendulum may have swung to
the other extreme,  with special interests successfully arguing for exaggerated fiscal
concessions in the name of improved financial sector performance.
'To  be sure, the enormous  fiscal cost of banking crises means that in many countries the financial system
has been a net charge on the budget in recent years.2
Financial sector taxation is complex both in theory and practice and it needs to evolve  in
response to financial innovation and wider economic changes.2 No simple blueprint is
proposed or attempted, but the discussion of theoretical, empirical and practical
considerations  does lead to a number of guidelines for developing what would constitute
a good financial sector tax system.
Proposals  for financial sector tax reform typically come from one or other of two
powerful perspectives.  Either the reformer is an enthusiast for a big simplification,
usually some form of "flat tax" (including VAT on financial services, zero taxation on
capital income, or a universal transactions  tax) or she is the advocate of subtle corrective
taxation designed to offset some of the many market failures to which the financial sector
is prone or to achieve other targeted objectives.
In practice, just like the perennial conflict between simplicity in tax administration  and
economic efficiency of the tax rates (not to speak of equity),  the two perspectives can
conflict rather severely.  Information and control requirements  of much of corrective
taxation tend to be poorly accommodated by the big simplifications.  This tension
remaining unresolved over the years, elements of each approach become embodied in the
taxation, explicit and implicit, of the sector.  At the same time, the ever-pressing  demands
of revenue intrude as a further influence on policy design.  As a result, the tax systems in
most countries often end up as a complex mixture defying any straightforward
rationalization.  The big flat-tax ideas are diluted and modified, the corrective taxes may
misfire by conflicting with others introduced for different reasons.
Meanwhile,  even as simplification and cofrection continue their tug-of-war,  policy design
can all too often neglect the two distinctive traps into which financial sector taxation can
fall, namely the sector's unique capacity for arbitrage and sensitivity to inflation and thus
to non-indexed taxes.  This paper argues that the practical design of financial  sector
taxation should be guided by a defensive approach in which proposed taxes are assessed
relative to their ability to resist arbitrage and their degree of inherent indexation.
Although the defensive approach does not provide an adjudication between simplification
and correction  it will protect against many of the worst distortions which have been
observed.
If a good tax system for the financial  system is one which, so far as possible, (a)
minimizes the distortions it imposes (for a given amount of revenue collected), especially
by causing the formal  financial sector to be bypassed through disintermediation to
untaxed or differently taxed competitors, (b) is corrective  of known distortions (such as
those which result from imperfect and asymmetric information,  and (c) does not push tax
collection from the sector beyond the point where marginal  distorting costs exceed those
elsewhere in the economy,  then the theory and experience described  in the remaining
chapters of this study do suggest some key practical  guidelines.
2 The survey of recent developments  by Levin and Ritter (2003) documents  the considerable variety that
continues to exist among industrial country systems.3
(i)  While reformers should not expect to find a complete and practical solution in any of
the 'big ideas',  each has lessons for a good system.
- Even if practicalities impede its introduction as such, the notion of a VAT on
financial services represents  a useful benchmark against which existing and
proposed indirect taxes can be compared for their burden and impact.
- Significant financial transactions taxes are hard to justify on theoretical grounds
and should be resorted to only as a transitory device when fiscal revenue  is under
particular pressure.
- Heavy emphasis  on the taxation of income from capital should be avoided.
(ii) Attempts at corrective taxation should be undertaken with extreme caution as history
suggests that unintended side-effects  or deadweight  losses may dominate the results.
This implies that special tax-based  schemes to encourage stock exchange  listing,
household saving and the like, should be viewed with caution, bearing in mind the
substantial  opportunity cost in terms of lost revenue and the questionable gains.
(iii)  While tax shifting is common throughout the economy, the potential for arbitrage is
very high in finance.  All financial sector taxes need to be designed in as arbitrage-proof
a way as possible (our first defensive criterion).
(iv)  Inflation generally has a more pervasive  effect in finance on the impact of taxation.
All financial sector taxes need to be designed to be as inflation-proof as possible (the
second defensive  criterion).
(v) Approximating taxation of the financial sector to that other sectors is a reasonable
goal: the challenge lies in mapping the somewhat distinctive institutions and concepts of
financial intermediation to that of the remainder of the economy, distinguishing between
its role as an intermediary and manager of the funds of others  from those of a true
principal.  This allows one to map the various tax rates and tax bases affecting financial
firms to the more familiar concepts most closely corresponding:  sales taxes, corporate
income tax, collection on account of customer income taxes etc.
The remainder of this paper discusses the background to each of these guidelines,
referring as appropriate to the chapters of a forthcoming edited volume on the topic
(Honohan, 2003b).  Section 2 reviews the main forms of tax that are relevant.  Section 3
describes the thrust of reform ideas.  Section 4 examines the effectiveness of the several
corrective taxes that have been employed.  Section 5 highlights the two most distinctive
relevant features of the financial system for designing tax structures.  Section 6 comes to
the practical question of tax rates and how to calibrate these for comparability with non-
financial taxes.  Section 7 concludes.
2.  The main types of explicit  and implicit tax
Governments  have used financial intermediaries to relieve their budgetary pressures in
three main ways.  First, they have applied a variety of explicit taxes, some of which are
common to firms in other sectors of the economy;  some of which are special to the4
financial sector (such as financial transactions taxes, unremunerated reserve requirements
and deposit insurance premia) and some of which seem similar to those applied to other
sectors, but in practice have a qualitatively different impact even if imposed at the same
nominal rate.  Additionally,  differential  application of mainstream explicit taxation
(including different rates of tax) to financial  intermediaries can be important, as in the
treatment of loan-loss provisions in calculating taxable income, or in the application of
sales taxes to interest received by banks.  Second, they have imposed reserve
requirements  which have had the effect of boosting the net revenue of the central bank
and hence indirectly the government.  Third they have made regulations channeling  funds
to government or favored sectors and borrowers  in ways that involve implicit subsidies,
notably by imposing interest rate ceilings.
Explicit Taxes
Taxes may be levied on many different elements of a financial intermediary's  business.
Net corporate income (profits), gross revenue (interest and fees) and the value of
payments made or received through the intermediary are the most important types.
Interest paid by the intermediary to its creditors are also often taxed, and the intermediary
may be obliged to withhold this tax, thus making only net-of-tax payments  to the
creditors.  Less commonly,  elements of the balance sheet of the financial institution
(assets, liabilities or net capital) could also form tax bases.
Inasmuch as non-financial corporations  are also liable to corporate income tax and to a
variety of sales taxes, it is important to identify whether, and in what way, taxation of the
financial intermediary often differs sharply from the standard situation.  This can happen
either because the financial intermediary is subject to special rules or rates, or because the
way in which the standard tax is applied has a distinct incidence on financial
intermediaries because of characteristic ways in which their business differs structurally
from that of non-financial  businesses.
For instance, the total value of payments made and received by a bank (credits and
payment to customer accounts) is a large multiple of the total value-added of a bank.
Furthermore,  the value of payments bears no very stable relationship to the value-added
or profits of a bank.  As with the value of goods carried by shipping or airline companies,
a tax on such payments,  even at a low rate, could not be regarded as an approximation  to
a value-added tax on other companies. The same would be true of taxes levied on
securities market transactions.
On the other hand gross interest, insurance premium income and fee receipts in a non-
inflationary environment could be of the same order of magnitude (perhaps twice) the
value-added - not too far from the experience of many non-financial  companies.
However,  in contrast to these, and unlike net interest, the gross interest is highly sensitive
to the nominal level of wholesale interest rates and to expected inflation.  In a volatile
inflationary environment,  this too becomes a rather arbitrary tax base.
The calculation of appropriate reserves against loan losses is an issue for the accounting
of any company with receivables or other claims in its balance  sheet.  But it looms much5
larger for financial intermediaries,  where annual loan-losses  even in good years can often
be much larger than the profits earned.  Therefore the tax treatment of loan-loss
provisioning is relatively much more important for financial internediaries,  in that the
timing of very sizable tax payments can be at stake.
Reflecting the inertial element in explicit taxation of finance  are stamp and registration
duties which have a long history in taxation (having been applied to the formal
registration of legal documents including those recording transfers of property
ownership)  and which have their legacy in taxes on payments transaction and transactions
in securities  exchanges.  Modem tax systems depend to a large extent on approximations
to a comprehensive  income tax or expenditure  tax.  Stamp duties are poor approximations
of either concept.
Withholding taxes on interest paid to depositors and other forms of special treatment of
income received by the customers of financial intermediaries  can also be distorting,
especially when they apply at different rates to different categories of income (such as on
local currency,  and dollar-denominated  deposits).3
Reserve requirements & seigniorage
The inflation tax and related taxes deserve  a section by themselves  because of their
historical importance, the scale of potential revenue and the ease with which they can be
collected.
Requirements  that banks should hold a certain fraction of their deposits in the form of
liquid reserves whether in cash, at the central bank or at some analogous institution dates
at least to the early part of the I9th century and represented initially  a convenience  to
ensure the smooth completion of the daily clearing and to reduce the recourse of banks to
central bank borrowing.  Unremunerated as reserves placed with the central bank often
were (though they would not have had to be to meet the above-mentioned  requirements),
reserve requirements boosted net income of the central bank, which is usually passed to
the fiscal authority as a dividend payment in due course and recognized as a non-tax
revenue item in the budget.  In this way the banks were implicitly taxed and the budget
relieved.  The fiscai element was at first not considered especially important, but it
became so as bank margins narrowed,  especially where nominal interest rates were rising.
Some central banks responded by introducing remuneration  on required reserves; others
tolerated avoidance  through substitution by banks of non-reservable categories of
instrument.
Nowadays, reserve requirements  are generally seen as an extension of the base of
seigniorage, inasmuch  as substitution of deposits for cash holdings had reduced the base
of seigniorage as a tax.
Secondary liquidity reserve requirements were also imposed in several countries, usually
to be held in designated government securities,  sometimes sold directly to the banks with
3Differential  treatment of taxation of dividends of listed companies can also be seen as an implicit negative
tax on the used of formal  stock markets.6
off-market yields and as such embodying a fairly obvious implicit tax.  Such
requirements  have often also been imposed on insurance companies  and other non-bank
intermediaries.  These types of requirement  thus shade into directed credit and interest
ceiling arrangements.
Directed  credit  and interest ceilings
Control over where the loanable funds mobilized by the financial system will be applied
is in principle a distinct motivation to that driving reserve and liquidity requirements, but
it too has a clear fiscal dimension.  This kind of mechanism has been operated in nearly
all countries over the years and takes many forms.  Sometimes there is a requirement to
place a special deposit amounting to a specified proportion of the bank's mobilized
resources in the central bank or another public agency charged with onlending these to
borrowers in preferred  sectors.  Sometimes there is a requirement to lend a certain
fraction of the bank's resources to specified sectors, or failing that, to deposit an
equivalent amount with a specialized bank that can do the lending.  Whether or not there
is an explicit interest rate ceiling on these sectoral requirements,  the diversion of funds
has the effect of lowering the market-clearing  rate for them and this will act as if there
were a tax on the interest income from this part of the lending (partly compensated by a
higher market-clearing  rate on non-favored  sectors.  Except where the government is the
borrower, the benefit of this tax does not directly go to it, but it is appropriate to see the
budget as a hidden beneficiary, in that, absent the directed credit,  subsidization of the
preferred borrowers would have to have been done through other means,  including direct
budgetary allocations.
Systemwide interest rate ceilings, much rarer now than in the past, and capital controls
having the effect of lowering local interest rates and this too can be seen as a tax affecting
financial  intermediation.  The government's budget is almost always the largest single
borrower, and as such the biggest direct beneficiary of system-wide  interest ceilings and
their equivalents.
3.  The bMg refoirm Mieas
One general approach to financial sector taxation is to attempt a great simplification on
the theory that low rates and a wide base with few exemptions is likely to generate
relatively low distortions. This approach holds out the prospect not only of minimizing
the incentive for complex schemes of financial engineering designed to avoid tax, but
also of making such schemes relatively difficult to develop.
The three main handles for taxation:  income, expenditure and transactions, have each
been the subject of prominent and extensively discussed grand and simple schemes.
These are, (i) the proposition that capital income should not be taxed at all, (ii) the
proposal that value-added by the financial services industry should be subject to a
uniform tax and (iii) the idea that a tax on all fmancial transactions at a very low rate
could generate very large revenues with negligible distortion.  We consider these one by
one.7
Capital  income - should it be taxed at all?
The underlying basis for the argument that it might be optimal not t6 tax income from
capital at all is the insight that this involves a form of double taxation on future
consumption.  By shifting the perspective from the statutory base of the tax - capital
income - to a variable more closely relevant to economic policy, namely utility based on
household consumption, this economic analysis of capital taxation shows that a constant
nominal or statutory tax rate on capital  income implies  an effective rate on consumption
that may increase without bound for consumption far into the future.  Because  future
consumption depends  on the reinvestment of after-tax capital income, the more remote is
the date of future consumption,  the higher the effective tax rate; and this effective tax rate
may increase without bound.  Evidently, optimal tax policy can improve  on a situation
with infinitely high effective tax rates; accordingly, this reasoning points to the optimality
of capital income taxation converging to zero (cf. Boadway and Keen, 2003).
Many subtle qualifications  can be made to the implicit models of utility, income and
consumption underlying this analysis, and the precise prescription for zero taxation is not
very robust, yet it retains  some force and serves as an important counterweight  to
proposals  for high rates of capital income taxation designed to achieve  other goals.  One
such goal is that of ensuring the socially optimal rate of national saving (since private
markets cannot generally be relied upon to do this and may result in oversaving).
Another is redistribution.  Yet even if households  differ in their wage-earning  capacity
and tax policy is being used for redistributional goals, these can best be achieved by a tax
on wage income alone - at least in simple models of intertemporal preferences.  Once
again the use of capital income taxation would be suboptimal because of the compound
interest effect.
If income from capital is not to be taxed, then it might seem to follow that the income of
financial  intermediaries ought not to be taxed either.  But in practice some corporate
income - perhaps  a large portion - represents pure profit or economic rent.  Neglected in
the models that generate the no-capital-income-tax  result, pure profit may be taxed
without distortion, and this argument is another important qualification.  Where financial
markets are uncompetitive  - and the scale economies that are involved in parts of finance
make this relevant, especially in financially closed economies - this could be an
empirically important factor.4
A stronger line of attack on the zero capital income tax proposition  comes from practical
issues of enforcement and informational  deficiencies.  If capital income goes completely
untaxed,  this may provide an easy loophole for high earning households to camouflage
their earnings by transforming or laundering them into capital income.  A tax on capital
4 Caminal (2003) explores the implications for tax incidence of market power in banking.  As he and others
have noted,  though, leaving banks  with some untaxed economic rent (or franchise value  as it tends to be
called in the banking literature), can reduce the propensity,  potentially strong among msured banks, to
assume socially excessive  risks (Stiglitz,  1994, Caprio and Summers,  1996).  Indeed it has been argued that
the credibility of banks as delegated  monitors for the depositors  depends on their being able to earn profits
in most states of the world (Diamond,  1996).8
income may be an important practical  expedient to close such loopholes.5 If so,
withholding the tax at source, or taxing corporate income as a form of implicit
withholding may further help to overcome the tax authorities'  informational  disadvantage
and administrative collection costs.  However, these considerations tend to be swamped in
many developing countries by the need to consider the impact on foreign-owned firms.
Given the fact that many capital exporting countries allow credit to their residents  for tax
paid in the host country, this can pave the way for host countries to tax foreign-owned
companies in the knowledge  that they will not be discouraged from investing to the
extent that the tax paid to the host country simply reduces their home country tax.
The elegant simplicity of the theoretical  argument against capital income tax thus
ultimately fails, though it points to a need to justify such taxation - and the taxation of the
income of financial and other companies - on grounds other than those of simple
consistency with taxation of wage income.
Taxingfinancial  services: can a VAT work?
About 70 per cent6 of the world's population live in countries with a VAT and the tax is a
key source of government revenue in more than  120 nations (Ebrill et al, 2001).  So if a
VAT is the way forward for the bulk of (indirect) taxation on expenditure, to what extent
should it be the model for financial services also?
The first observation has to be that in practice, most financial services are "exempt" in
virtually all countries  employing a VAT.  This does not mean that these financial  services
wholly escape the VAT, as the status of "exempt"  does not allow financial service
providers to recover VAT paid by their taxable suppliers  and built into the price of their
inputs.  Indeed, taxable firms who use financial services as inputs cannot recover the
VAT paid by the suppliers of financial service firms either, with the result that there is
tax "cascading".  But value which has been added by the exempt financial  sector firms is
not captured in the tax.  Whether aggregate tax receipts would increase or fall if the
exemption were removed is an unresolved empirical issue (which depends not only on
the degree to which financial  services are used by tax-liable firms, but also on the
different rates of VAT that may be in effect.
The exemption of most financial services from VAT appears to be a historical inheritance
without much political or economic rationale.  While it is not difficult to measure
the value-added  of a bank (profits plus wages), there is the practical difficulty of deciding
how much credit taxable firms which use financial services would be entitled to claim,
seeing that the charge for many financial services is an implicit one bundled with others
in, for example, the spread between deposit and lending rates.  Determining how much of
the spread should be attributed to depositor services and how much to borrower services
5 Differentiating the rate of withholding tax as between income from high risk (equity) and low risk (debt,
deposits) assets could help achieve progressivity even absent information on the income of the recipients,
assuming diminishing risk aversion with wealth (Gordon, 2000).
6 The largest countries, by population,  without a VAT are India, United States, Iran, Ethiopia, Congo DR,
Myanmar, Afghanistan, North Korea, Iraq and Malaysia.9
is not straightforward.  Thus it is not obvious how much credit each should receive for
VAT already paid on inputs.
Yet it is not impossible to devise simple rules of thumb which can provide a reasonable
approximation.  Thus, for example, the cash flow method where VAT is paid on all net
cash receipts (including capital amounts), could be adequate in a static environment.
However, start-up problems and treatment of risk may not be adequately resolved by this
method, and changing tax rates also presents difficulties for the approach. A variant of
the cash-flow method, using suspense accounts and an accounting rate of interest to bring
transactions  at different dates to a common standard, could help ease the transition
problems  and has been shown to be workable by detailed pilot studies in the EU (Poddar,
2003).
The lack of any clear potential revenue gain, and fears about the practical complexity and
possible hidden distortions or loopholes, have inhibited any significant move to bringing
financial  services into the VAT net.7 The resulting distortions  are quite serious in some
cases.  For one thing there is a clear incentive to self-supply inputs.  Second, there are
distortions  at the margin, with financial services such as factoring,  which can represent  a
particularly effective form of lending to SMEs - low cost and low risk - severely tax-
disadvantaged by falling within the VAT net in many jurisdictions for which other forms
of lending are exempt.
The grand simplification offered by the VAT thus fails, not on theoretical grounds, but on
the grounds on administrative and practical difficulties  or uncertainties.  Nevertheless,  it
does point in the direction of what might be desirable for substitute indirect taxes.8
Transactions  taxes:  panacea or  Pandora  's box?
Because of their loose connection  with consumption  and utility, and their potential  for
generating significant distortions  in the organization of production  and distribution,
transactions taxes (including trade taxes) have lost favor as a tool of general tax policy
over the years relative to income and expenditure taxes.  But the vast scale of financial
sector transactions has presented itself to some scholars and some governments as a
convenient base for rapidly generating substantial revenue.
There is a paradox here in that critics of transactions taxes point to the potentially
seriously distortions that is causes, while advocates argue that, because of the large base,
very sizable revenues can be realized with low nominal tax rates.  To the extent that the
7 Though a few countries have introduced substitute taxes based on applying a rate to the estimated value-
added of banks obtained by summing the wage and profits.
8  Compare the Chinese "business  tax," which has recently applied at the rate of 8 percent to the income
from a bank's trading portfolio, but is not applied to the income from the bank's investment portfolio.  This
strongly discourages  trading by banks in government securities, thereby sharply diminishing liquidity in
that market.  A VAT-like tax would not create such a distortion.  (A further distortion in China comes from
the exemption from income tax of interest from government bonds, but the inclusion of capital gains from
trading such bonds at a rate of 33 percent.  Such problems are avoided in some other countries by treating
capital gains from trading activities of financial intermediaries  on  par with income for the purposes of
direct taxation.)10
deadweight cost of a tax is often supposed to be proportional  to the square of the tax rate,
introducing a low-rate financial transactions  tax in order to allow a reduction in the much
higher rates of labor income or other taxes might be supposed to reduce total deadweight
in the tax system as a whole.
At the most extreme,  a recent proposal suggests that what seems at first sight to be an
administratively  trivial and quantitatively tiny 0. 15% rate of tax on all automated
payments could raise enough revenue (in the United States) to replace the entire existing
tax system (Feige, 2000).  Feige shows that existing automated payments amounted (in
1996) to somewhere in the region of US$300-500 trillion, or of the order of 50 times the
value of GDP.  How, he asks, could anyone argue that a tax rate of 0. 15%, even applied
to such a large base, be considered seriously distorting by comparison with the existing
tax regime?
Analysis of the payments that would be affected reveal that about 85% relate to financial
transactions  (purchase or sale of stocks, bonds, foreign exchange  or other money
changing transactions, etc.).  To a large extent, then, the initial burden of an universal
payments tax would fall on the financial sector.
Of course, if  we proceed (as before with the capital income tax) to transform our
perspective from the statutory or nominal base to the more economically relevant concept
of consumption, we see that the average good or service in the typical consumption
bundle must be 'hit' by the tax not once, but dozens of times, as it works its way through
financing, design, production and distribution.
Criticisms of this proposal fall into three main groups.
First that the tax would not collect as much revenue due to the sizable elasticities
involved.9 Financial  sector transactions in particular would be arbitraged in such a way
as to drastically reduce the number of recorded transactions.  What are now sequences  of
linked transactions carried out for little more than book-keeping convenience  at
negligible cost would be collapsed into a single more complex transaction.  Portfolio
readjustments  would be made with reduced frequency without substantially altering
expected return and risk.  Microeconomic  studies of the precise mechanisms  that are at
work to generate gross transactions  of such a high multiple of GDP in wholesale financial
markets are not plentiful (but see Lyons, 2001, for the foreign exchange market)  so that
reliable estimates of these effects are not yet available.  Furthermore,  the scope for
avoiding such a tax through offshore financial transactions has to be taken seriously.
The second main objection is that, even if  the tax did collect the expected revenue, the
distortion costs would not necessarily be any smaller than with the existing system.  This
9  This consideration needs to be kept in mind by those who would see the proposal  as socially progressive
in that payments in which they are directly or indirectly involved likely represent a much higher multiple of
the income of prosperous people than of the poor.  After all, if such a tax did not raise the hoped-for
revenue,  the consequence might have to be cutbacks in public services which disproportionately benefit the
poor.11
objection relies either on (a) the observation that the financial system would bear the
main brunt, and as such that the tax would in fact be more concentrated, not less; or (b)
the observation that, in terms of final consumption,  the tax would effectively cascade  to
cumulative rates comparable to those observed at present.
No country has seriously considered replacing its tax system with an universal payments
tax, but there are numerous examples of partial transactions taxes, applying  for example
to bank debits or to securities transactions.' 0 Bank debit taxes introduced in half a dozen
Latin American countries in the past 15 years or so in a bid to raise revenue have been
successful in that goal, at least for a while,  with revenues ranging from about 12% of GDP
to as much as 3  ',2% in one case for one year.  It is fair to say that revenue  from these
taxes held up unexpectedly well over 3-4 years.  That revenue would fall off after the first
year was predicted by many, and it did occur on average, though the effect did not prove
to be statistically significant in regression of the available data.  Nevertheless,  many of
the schemes had to be adapted administratively in the course of their operation, to exempt
some transactions that would otherwise have been too distorting  (and probably also to
capture others that had escaped the net). The distortions of these and of securities
transactions taxes have been discussed in the literature:  they certainly are distorting, yet
applied in moderation, these transactions taxes have been less distorting than many
observers expected (Kirilenko and Summers, 2003; Habermeier  and Kirilenko, 2003).
Thus, despite expectations that they would not only distort financial markets and drive
out capital, but would quickly lose their revenue-raising  ability, such transactions taxes
have been surprisingly resilient.  But they are far from being a panacea,  and indeed have
little to recommend them beyond  their ability to deliver revenue speedily and with low
direct administrative costs.
4.  Corrective taxes
It is not just taxation that distorts financial markets.  Information deficiencies,  monopoly
power and other factors push most financial markets away from the ideal of the atomistic
market with fully informed participants competing on a level basis.  Under these
circumstances,  the non-revenue  side-effects of taxes and tax-like measures can be turned
to advantage  and form part of the corrective policy structure in this area.
Indeed, many measures of this type may have regulation and market efficiency as their
primary objective, with revenue seen as a side-effect. 1  "  But as we will  see, the
effectiveness of many such measures in their supposedly corrective role has been
challenged and remains controversial.
1° Tobin taxes are much more focused and do not typically have revenue as the main objective, but instead
are seen as corrective taxes intended to reduce volatile speculative  capital  flows.  They have generated  an
enormous literature  and I am not going to summarize that here.
l l Not always explicitly accounted for, as when unremunerated  reserve requirements augment the central
banks net revenue but are nowhere accounted for explicitly as a revenue source.12
Deposit insurance:  supposedly helps stability, but maybe outweighed by the induced
moral hazard
The most complex and contentious of these debated corrective quasi-taxes  is deposit
insurance.
That it is a tax is fairly clear from the contributions  or levies that are generally imposed
on participating banks, especially given that these are typically compulsory  and that the
rate of tax usually bears at best an imperfect relation to the "fair premium".
Indeed, the anticipated gross revenue  from the levy is typically small and in many cases
is calculated to be insufficient to cover even the expected pay-out costs as calculated
using option-pricing formulae (Laeven, 2002).  Furthermore the probability distribution
of net payout costs is severely skewed:  systemic banking crises entailing fiscal costs of
up to 50% of a year's GDP are never matched by a corresponding deposit insurance fund
accumulation in lucky, crisis-free, countries.' 2
For many advocates, the perceived corrective role of deposit insurance is essentially one
of reducing the likelihood of a depositor panic.  By protecting depositors against the risk
that their deposits will be unpaid if a bank proves to be insolvent, it is hoped that a self-
fulfilling panic, including contagion to other banks triggered by the insolvency of one
bank can be avoided. 3 On the other hand, by lowering the vigilance of potentially
informed depositors,  the moral hazard of heightened risk-taking by the bankers,
unpunished by market discipline, could in theory result in heightened risk to the system
as a whole.
Although early deposit insurance schemes entailed a uniform insurance premium per
dollar of deposit, there have been moves in several countries to differentiate the rate of
premium in accordance with some measure of the perceived riskiness of the participating
bank's portfolio.  This dimension of such taxes is designed to reduce the moral hazard
potential  but it depends to some extent on the information  available to the deposit insurer
as to the accuracy of the ex ante risk assessment (Honohan and Stiglitz, 2001).  About a
quarter of schemes have some risk-differentiation,  but the differentials are small and are
not always systematically imposed (Demirgui.-Kunt  and Tobaci, 2001).14
12 Even the relatively much smaller fiscal costs of the US banking crises of the  1980s were more than
enough to empty the insurance funds.
13 Protection of the small depositor is another goal.  This is quite a distinct role, of course, as runs by small
depositors only do not threaten systemic liquidity.
14 Some examples:  the US premia currently vary according to two criteria, capitalization and supervisory
assessment,  from zero (for a well-capitalized bank that is highly rated by the supervisors) to 0.27 per cent
of deposits  (for an undercapitalized  bank which is seen by supervisors as posing a substantial probability of
loss to the insurer unless corrective  action is taken).  Argentina has charged a basic rate of 0.36 per cent
subject to being doubled where banks were paying high interest rates for deposits (and those with very high
rates were not covered at all).  Cameroon and other francophone  African countries impose 0.15 per cent
plus 0.5 per cent of net non-performing loans.  Other risk-based formulations, including  ex post
assessments are levied in other countries.13
Econometric  estimates of how financial system performance varies across countries with
the existence and characteristics  of deposit insurance systems suggest that, in countries
whose socio-political institutions are generally rated as strong need not fear that the
moral hazard side-effect will outweigh other beneficial  effects.  Although deposit
insurance weakens market discipline even in such countries, the effects seem to be offset
by better official oversight.  However, for countries with less well-developed institutions
(along the dimensions of rule of law, governance and corruption), the establishment of a
formal deposit insurance scheme'5 does appear to present a heightened risk of crisis
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache,  2000; Demirguic-Kunt  and Kane, 2002) and does not
even promote deposit growth (Cull, Senbet and Sorge, 2000).  Having risk-based deposit
insurance premia does not appear to mitigate the systemic risk, so that the potential for
introducing a corrective  structure of the deposit insurance tax may be limited.
Deposit insurance, with or without risk-based premia, may not be a very effective
corrective mechanism.  It clearly needs to be supplemented  in this role by strong
administrative or other controls, including  supervision of minimum capitalization  ratios
(Brock, 2003).  And it may interact with other taxes.  For instance, a tax on bank gross
receipts'6 will reduce the expected after-tax  return to a risky investment, though Brock
shows that there would be some offset to this inasmuch as the government  (deposit
insurer) is coinsuring the risk to a greater extent in the presence of such a tax.  On the
other hand, he also shows that a marginal reserve requirement (see below) could be more
likely to reduce the moral hazard effect on bank risk-taking behavior.  All in all, though,
the uncertain strength and reliability of such effects argue for blunter and more reliable
instruments in restraining  bank risk-taking,  a matter which lies beyond the scope of the
present exercise.
Provisioning  and capital  adequacy
The amount of loan-loss provisioning which is allowable to banks as a deduction against
income for tax purposes  can be a very significant factor in arriving at the net tax liability,
-- often sufficient to shelter the entire tax bill.  By the same token, this can be a matter of
considerable revenue significance  for the authorities.  But it has long been acknowledge
that there is a potential corrective role for the treatment of loan-loss provisions.  This
argument hinges on the arbitrariness which inevitably exists in arriving at a reasonable
provision that would result in the banks'  accounts representing  a true and fair picture of
the business.  If the fiscal rules have the effect of biasing company accounting,  this could
be damaging for the transparency of the financial system and for good decisions on risk
management.  Recent accounting scandals have focused attention  on the difficulty of
seeing through valuation procedures used in non-financial  company reporting procedures
and bank accounts can be arguably even less clearcut especially in times of economic
turbulence or change.
15 This, despite the consideration that a degree of implicit protection may be assumed by depositors even
when no formal scheme exists.
16 Such as has been in effect in China at a rate of 8 per cent (7 per cent since 2000), cf. Langlois, 2001
(though he rather overstates the evils of this tax).14
To the extent that equity capital represents a cushion protecting depositors and other
claimants against the consequences of a decline in the value of the bank's loan portfolio
and other assets, the equity holders (and the directors to the extent that they are acting as
the equity holders'  agents) of a lightly capitalized bank at risk of failure will have an
incentive to minimize the amount of capital which they have truly at risk (thereby
transferring risk to other claimants), provided they can do this without inducing  an
increase in the required return on their other liabilities.  If the fiscal authority disallows
the deductibility of reasonable  loan-loss provisions (for example provisions that can be
justified on the basis of a reasonable objective forecasting model), that reinforces the
incentive to understate provisions and thereby to overstate capital, potentially misleading
regulators and the market.
On the other hand,  a well-capitalized  bank may be more attracted by the advantages of
advancing tax deductibility,  and may use the range of uncertainty  to increase loan-loss
provisioning thereby reducing revenue.
Balancing the pressures of revenue needs with the risk of losing transparency is thus a
constant tug-of-war and different countries adopt different rules (Laurin and Majnoni,
2003; Sunley, 2003). A move away from mechanical rules (such as disallowing general
provisions but allowing specific provisions)  towards a more realistic,  forward-looking
accounting that allows predictable but not yet identified  losses to be adequately
provisioned, so long as these are accepted by the institutional regulator, would seem to be
the preferred  goal here.'7
Promoting  Saving
A very widespread explicit goal of corrective tax measures affecting the financial  sector
is the promotion of saving.  The goal is driven partly by fiscal needs, in an attempt to ease
the financing of government deficits, partly by a perception (colored by an earlier
generation of macroeconomic theories and, because of new research findings, no longer
generally accepted by economists) that aggregate  economic growth is, in the long-run,
driven by national  saving and partly by a desire to ensure that households  do not
undersave, particularly for retirement, but also for housing and education.' 8
In practice,  such measures tend not to affect all savings media equally, hence their
sometimes substantial impact on the structure and performance  of the financial system,
which, in certain cases  at least, can far outweigh the net impact of the policy on the goal
of increasing household saving (OECD,  1994, H-onohan,  1996).
For practical  reasons, measures that operate by modifying income tax schedules tend to
be relevant only in middle-income countries, or at least in countries which have achieved
a certain minimum level of the effectiveness of the income tax system.  Furthermore,
17 Various formulations are possible.  One is to have the tax authorities accept provisioning that had been
agreed by the prudential regulators.  A tougher approach would be to require the bank to defend its
provisioning on the basis of an objective forecasting method - though it needs to be recognized that such
forecasts are often more an art than a science.
18 Tax incentives are also widely used to favor health and life insurance  (Jappelli-Pistaferri,  2002).15
there is widespread skepticism among experts as to the effectiveness of mandatory saving
for housing in achieving the goal of improving access to housing for the targeted low-
income groups.  On the other hand mandatory retirement saving programs to appear to
increase national saving by a significant amount on average, especially perhaps where
they are tax-advantaged  (Jappelli-Pistaferri,  2003)
Other dimensions of corrective  financial  taxation
In other cases, supposedly corrective  financial sector taxation comes more in the form of
a vague and unthinking encouragement of what are seen as social "goods".  This is not
unique to the financial sector:  finance ministers are typically bombarded with proposals
to exempt from taxation items or activities thought to be meritorious.  Except where tax
relief appears to be the most effective way of correcting some market distortion that is
resulting in an undersupply of the item or activity in question,  the ministers are usually
advised to resist such special pleading.  But lobbying of this type does appear to be
notably successful in finance.  For example, consistent with the observation that most
countries  feel that their financial system is unduly bank-dominated,  there is constant
advocacy of tax concessions targeted at companies with a stock exchange listing."9 This
is at best a crude instrument, especially if the underlying reason for the
underdevelopment of the stock exchange lies in an insufficiently developed information
and legal infrastructure, as is often the case. Much better to direct policy attention to
correcting these infrastructural  deficiencies.
Another much used quasi-tax often thought of as, in a sense, corrective,  is the
unremunerated reserve requirement.  The sense in which this might have been thought of
as corrective is that it provides  a lever on which monetary policy can operate.  Actually,
as is now acknowledged by authorities  on monetary policy, the perceived need for
unremunerated reserve requirements  was based on a misconception.  Monetary policy
does not require unremunerated reserve requirements or any other quasi-tax  for its
effectiveness.  (cf. Brock, 2003)
5.  Two distinctive elements  for financial sector tax design
If there are two key features of the financial sector which distinguish it from other sectors
when it comes to designing taxation, these must surely be the system's capacity for
arbitrage and its sensitivity to inflation and thus to non-indexed taxes.
The system 's capacity  for arbitrage
Whether mainly flat or mainly corrective, the impact in practice of most financial  sector
taxes depends crucially on the extent to which they have been  constructed in such a way
19 In Egypt, very favorable  tax treatment of listed firms from the 1980s induced a widespread listing of
firms on the Cairo and Alexandria  Stock Exchange, to which the lenient listing requirements  provided no
discouragement.  Over 500 companies were listed by 1990;  ten years later,  the figure had grown to more
than  1,000.  However, most of the firms were closely held and the free-float of shares is little more than
one-tenth of the total capitalization. The market capitalization of the actively traded free-float was only
about  1 percent of GDP.  In this case the supposedly corrective tax exemption failed to achieve the
presumed objective of a deep and liquid equity market. Recent listing rule reforms are expected to
dramatically cut the number of listed firms in 2003.16
as to be insulated from the high elasticities that prevail in the sector.  Arbitrage between
functionally equivalent contracts or institutional forms bedevils tax design in this area.
Incidence-shifting  of bank taxes
Because of substitutability  and the possibility of arbitrage and near-arbitrage,  the full
incidence of taxation imposed on one component of the intermediation process (deposits,
loans, intermediary profits), may very well be fully shifted to another component.
Ramon Caminal has recently developed a formal model of intermediation,  taking account
of the provision of liquidity as well as intermediation  services by banks in order to
examine the influence  of various bank taxes on volumes and cost of intermediation, those
provided to depositors by banks.  Several striking results are obtained.  For instance, the
ability of at least some borrowers to substitute alternative sources of funding implies a
tendency for the imposition of a VAT on banking services to be passed back to
depositors.20  Furthermore,  the conditions under which a tax on bank loans falls not on
the cost of funds, but instead on the return to bank shareholders  are also plausible,
including a range of assumptions  on competitive conditions.  (However, if regulatory
capital requirements  are likely to be binding in the sense that banks hold more capital
than they would freely choose to, a tax on banks'  profits may in contrast fall wholly on
lending interest rates).  In contrast to general models of production, then, plausible
modeling of the degree of substitutability in banking involves such high elasticities that
predicting the incidence of a tax to fall wholly on a class of agents not directly the subject
of the taxation can be plausibly predicted.  On the other hand, recognizing that the
services provided to savers by investment funds may be highly substitutable for some of
the services obtained from bank deposits, Caminal has also shown how, under reasonable
circumstances, the presence of untaxed investment funds implies that taxation of deposits
will affect only the monitoring and transaction service provision by banks, and not the
provision of liquidity.
These contrasting cases suggest the heightened risks involved in imposing taxes under the
assumption that the taxpayer who is liable will be the one incurring the incidence of the
tax.  Just what the incidence will be can be worked out in theoretical  cases (to a greater
extent than is the case for taxes on non-financial sectors), though the task of matching
these theoretical  cases to the real world is a striking challenge for the empirical  policy
analyst given the difficulty of estimating many of the relevant behavioral relationships,  as
is evident from their relative absence from the literature,  even for industrial countries.
Along with the shifted incidence can be a very large behavioral effect.  This may not be
socially costly in equilibrium (if the substitute truly is functionally equivalent) but short-
term disruption and costly incurring of new sunk capital to support the substitute activity
could be quite severe.
New financial instruments
At the heart of financial innovation is, in the words of Boadway and Keen (2003), the
creation of new instruments by repackaging  the cash-flows generated by others.
20 At least under the plausible assunption that the marginal borrower is VAT-liable while they marginal
depositor is not (cf Caminal, 2003).17
Arbitrage is here the mechanism, not just an outcome.  The reasons for this repackaging
are manifold - to better align the instruments with the liquidity and maturity preferences
of different classes of investors, to shift particular risks between investors  who have
different appetites for them, whether based on information or on correlations with the
remainder of their portfolio.  If the rebundled instruments are differently treated by
taxation, this can block the repackaging and inhibit the risk-sharing that is involved.2
Furthermore, of course, differential  tax treatment (for example of debt and equity,  or of
income and capital)  can be a powerful driver of innovation designed for no better reason
than to repackage  cash flows into a less heavily taxed form.
Boadway and Keen note that many of these issues have been dealt with on a piecemeal
and ad hoc way by tax authorities in advanced economies.  Theoreticians have been
exploring ways of rationalizing the taxation of new financial instruments, both by
devising  unambiguous decompositions  of the instruments into fundamental  components,
and by determining the timing (accrual versus realization) at which the taxable amounts
are crystallized.  But no general agreement  among theoreticians,  let alone practitioners  in
advanced economies, has yet emerged.  This rules out, for the present, the possibility of
developing country tax authorities'  piggy-backing on a pre-packaged  solution.  Indeed,
for market participants, the tax situation is even less satisfactory in developing countries
where the likely tax treatment of new instruments is often undetermined or disputed.
Sensitivity to inflation
Although inflation has pervasive effects throughout the economy and in particular has
been shown to be negatively correlated with growth, at least for sufficiently high rates, it
is evident that banking and other parts of the financial sector which extensively employ
nominal financial contracts can be more directly and deeply affected than most.  High
and variable rates of inflation induce significant substitution away from non-interest-
bearing monetary assets in favor of assets offering higher real returns and inflation
hedges.  This can, on the one hand, shrink the size of the banking system's
intermediation.  But, on the other hand, the financial system's capacity to provide the
instruments to insulate economic agents from the inflation  will tend to expand this side of
its activities.  Indeed, empirically, the balance-sheet  size of the banking system is found
to shrink with inflation,  whereas inflation  is found to be positively associated with
profitability and the value-added of the banking system (Honohan, 2003a).
Inflation also has a strong influence on the government's  finances, and, the term
"inflation tax" is well chosen, even though there is no perfect correspondence between
the implicit inflation tax rate as measured by the opportunity cost of holding interest-free
base money (which will be related to the expected inflation rate), and the flow of
financing to the budget from money creation (Honohan,  1996).
The interaction between inflation  and a non-indexed tax system can have sizable  and
unexpected effects  even in a country with single digit inflation (Feldstein,  1983,  1999).
As inflation increases, the double distortions of inflation  and taxation can be
21 For example, the existence  of withholding taxes  on gross interest receipts can stifle the market in interest
rate swaps.18
multiplicative  rather than additive, with severe consequences.  For financial sector firms,
the impact of inflation on the scale and activity of financial services firrns needs to be
considered alongside its impact on their tax-inclusive  cost structures.  The effective tax
rate of several commonly employed financial sector taxes, such as taxes on gross interest
receipts of banks, or unremunerated  reserve requirements  rise almost in proportion to the
rate of inflation.  And in the case of nominal interest rate ceilings the effective rate of tax
rises more than in proportion to the rate of inflation.  Given that inflation rates can be
high, volatile and unplanned,  this degree of sensitivity to inflation in the effective rate of
tax is generally quite undesirable (Honohan,  2003a).
Good tax policy needs to take account of these sensitivities.  A defensive approach is
needed which ensures that the tax structure is not vulnerable to severe distortion  along
these lines.
6.  CaUlbrating dlffereint types of tam
Where a defensive approach has not been followed,  poorly constructed tax systems  -
whether the consequence of a drive for revenue, or of misdirected sophistication - have
often had sizable unexpected side-effects.
Part of the problem in many difficult cases has been that the financial sector taxes and
implicit or quasi-taxes have not been seen for what they are.  Thus very high effective tax
rates have emerged in cases where legislators would not have conceived of imposing
comparable nominal tax rates.22
On the other hand, lobbyists are prone to finding ways of exaggerating the tax burden on
financial intermediaries by adding-up taxes which touch the sector only slightly and
expressing these as a percentage  of the sector's profits.
Is there some simple way of approximating the burden of a given tax, or better the impact
of reform in a particular tax?  This section looks at how this question might be addressed
in respect of the main types of tax or quasi-tax which most often raise such questions.
The relevant taxes include:  (i) unremunerated reserve requirements  (ii) tax on
intermediary interest receipts;  (iii) withholding tax on interest payments by
intermediaries;  (iv) stamp tax on bank debits; (v) stamp tax on bank loans.
One practical  approach to calibrating these taxes and judging their appropriateness  is to
map each tax into its closest non-financial  analog.  Thus one decides whether the tax is
more nearly an income or a sales tax. If an income tax, is it more a tax on the
intermediary's  shareholders or on the intermediary's  fund-providing  customers?  If a
sales tax, what is the product that is being taxed and what is its net-of-tax price?
22 The case of Russia in the 1990s, described by Granville (2003), is a cautionary example.19
As with most issues of incidence, these questions cannot always easily be answered.
Nevertheless,  even an approximate  answer can clarify the issues  significantly.
Market power and substitution possibilities  are central.  In many countries, the market
power of banks is being eroded, both by international competition for depositor services
and from alternative sources of industrial funding  as well as by liberalization of entry.
Taxes and quasi-taxes that might hitherto have been assumed to fall on the shareholders
of banks in a manner analogous to an income tax may now be more likely to be passed on
to those customers who have few alternatives, notably small borrowers whose
creditworthiness is costly to determine.  (Caminal, 2003,  models these issues in some
detail and Cardoso,  2003, presents interesting evidence that pass-through has been very
high in Brazil).
Under such conditions, the taxes described fall into three groups: those that are best seen
as a tax on lending services, those on transactions  services and income taxes on suppliers
of funds.
Both unremunerated reserve requirements  imposed on banks and special taxes on interest
receipts of banks  are best seen (under these circumstances)  as similar to sales taxes on the
provision of lending services (e.g.  credit appraisal and monitoring) to small borrowers.
The effective tax rate can be approximated by comparing the tax paid (or, in the case of
unremunerated reserve requirements,23 the opportunity cost of the reserved funds) per
dollar lent to the net of tax cost of the service.  High effective tax rates often result.
Official  estimates for Brazil in 2001  can be read, in this perspective, as implying an 85%
effective tax rate on average for lending (Cardoso, 2003).  Furthermore, because the tax
base - the cost of intermediation  services - is not sensitive to the nominal rate of interest,
whereas the tax paid is, the resulting effective rate can be very sensitive to the nominal
rate of interest and thus to the rate of inflation (Honohan,  2002, 2003a).
The stamp duty on bank loans, typically proportional to the loan size but not to its
maturity can be analyzed  in much the same way.  In this case the effective  tax rate may
increase sharply as maturities shorten, allowing the methodology to reveal the obvious
technical  deficiency in such a tax.24
Transactions  taxes and the stamp tax on cheques likely fall mainly on the user of the
transactions  involved.  The relevant tax rate is thus computed as if it were a sales tax on
the relevant service.  This allows us to compute the stamp tax on cheques in Chile in
2002 as a sales tax rate of 100%,  compared with a rate of about 20% for the similar tax
then imposed in Ireland.
23  Or reserves remunerated below market rate. A very simple break-even calculation  implies that an
addition of X  to the loan interest rate will be required to recover an interest penalty of (p  applied to reserve
requirements  of 0 where  X=  p  0/(1- 0).
24  In Egypt, the application of a constant  stamp tax independent of loan maturity hampered  the development
of short-term  bridging finance.20
Judging the appropriate treatment of the withholding of income tax on deposit interest
requires careful consideration of the effectiveness of the remainder of income tax.  If
income tax on the revenue from competing capital  assets is collected effectively,  then the
fact that tax due on deposit interest is withheld at source can best be thought of as chiefly
an administrative convenience,  rather than as an additional imposition  affecting the
withholding intermnediaries  and their other customers.  The empirical judgment here will
often depend crucially on the degree of intemational capital mobility (cf. Huizinga and
Nicodeme, 2001)
7.  Concluding  remarks
It would be hard to justify a dogmatic approach to reforming financial sector taxation on
the basis of the review here presented.  None of the extreme blueprints that have been
proposed for the optimal structure of financial sector taxation can be fully endorsed.
But there are important lessons. Both empirical experience and theoretical propositions
suggest that some financial sector taxation can have unanticipatedly large and damaging
effects.  Therefore the main message proposed here is one of moderation.  There is no
reason why the financial sector should not pay its share of needed tax revenue, but design
should be defensive in the sense of guarding against the two major vulnerabilities to
which the sector is prone: sensitivity to arbitrage and sensitivity to inflation.
Starting with the overall question of capital income tax, the case for exempting capital
income from all taxation (the first "big idea" floating in the field) is too narrow to justify
action, and all that we would propose in this regard is to take the literature  as a caution
against excessively high capital income tax rates, both in absolute terms and in
comparison with income tax.  Attempting to "soak the rich" through a high capital
income tax rate may be an unwise way to proceed.
The second big idea, that of extending VAT to financial services, seems much better-
based.  It certainly seems a more desirable goal than attempts to rely heavily on
transactions taxes (whose distorting effects must soon dominate even if they have shown
their rough and ready merits as transitory revenue-spinners  in times of fiscal pressure).
Yet here too excessive enthusiasm should be tempered.  The VAT might be the way to go
in a world where administrative collection costs were low, but there may be much less to
gain from it than appears at first sight and pioneering its adoption could be a diversion for
a developing economy unless the authorities are sure of their administrative capacity to
be pioneers in the area.  For most, the VAT should best, perhaps, be seen as a benchmark
against which to compare other indirect taxes in regard to their neutrality and their burden
(effective tax rate equivalent on relevant value added).
Given the propensity for inflation rates to be high and volatile, taxes and quasi-taxes
which are super-sensitive to inflation should be avoided.  Taxes with such features should
be replaced with others that are more inflation-neutral.21
Above all, each tax proposal should be considered in terms of the possible substitutes
which exist for the activity, asset, return or transaction being taxed and which could both
magnify the behavioral  effect of the tax and place its incidence far from where it was
originally expected.  This must be the key defensive mechanism.
And, in making judgments on the overall burden of taxation on financial intermediation,
which inevitably requires some assessment of incidence,  particular efforts need to be
made to isolate those taxes that, it can reasonably be assumed, are passed through to
depositors.  Income tax on deposit interest collected at source, for example, is not borne
by the interest payer if income tax on other sources of capital income are also efficiently
collected.22
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